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Abstract
We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning about market behavior and that
provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning. Agents are ‘internally rational’, i.e., maximize
discounted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent subjective beliefs about the
future, but agents may not be ‘externally rational’, i.e., may not know the true stochastic process for payoff
relevant variables beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes and fundamentals. We apply
this approach to a simple asset pricing model and show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined
by investors’ expectations of the price and dividend in the next period, rather than by expectations of the
discounted sum of dividends. As a result, learning about price behavior affects market outcomes, while
learning about the discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilibrium prices. Stock prices equal the
discounted sum of dividends only after making very strong assumptions about agents’ market knowledge.
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1. Motivation
The rational expectations hypothesis (REH) places enormous demands on agents’ knowledge
about how the market works. For most models it implies that agents know exactly what market
outcome will be associated with any possible contingency that could arise in the future.1 This
appears utterly unrealistic given that state contingent markets that could provide agents with such
detailed information often fail to exist.
The objective of this paper is to present a rigorous decision-theoretic setup that allows to
relax these strong informational assumptions about how the market works and that is useful for
modeling learning about market behavior by agents. As we show, relaxing these informational
assumptions can have important implications for model behavior.
The basic idea is to separate the standard rationality requirements embedded in the REH into
an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ rationality component. Internal rationality requires that agents
make fully optimal decisions given a well-defined system of subjective probability beliefs about
payoff relevant variables that are beyond their control or ‘external’, including prices. External
rationality postulates that agents’ subjective probability belief equals the objective probability
density of external variables as they emerge in equilibrium.
We propose to relax the external rationality assumption but to fully maintain internal ratio-
nality in a model with well-specified microfoundations. This reflects the basic conviction that
internal rationality is a good starting point for analyzing social interactions. As we show, how-
ever, internal rationality is not sufficient to achieve external rationality. Specifically, internally
rational agents cannot simply derive the equilibrium distribution of market prices through a
deductive reasoning process. The REH is thus not a consequence of optimal behavior at the
individual level. Instead, to achieve external rationality one typically needs to endow internally
rational agents with a lot of additional information about the market.
While we propose to relax external rationality, we suggest at the same time to consider small
deviations from the external rationality assumption that is embedded in the REH. Specifically,
we consider agents who entertain subjective beliefs that are not exactly equal to the objective
density of external variables but that will be close to the beliefs that an agent would entertain
under the REH. This amounts to relaxing the ‘prior beliefs’ that agents are assumed to entertain
under the REH and to study the economic implications of such a relaxation.
Doing so requires changing the microfoundations of our standard models. Specifically, it re-
quires enlarging the probability space over which agents condition their choices, and including
all payoff-relevant external variables, i.e., all variables that agents take as given. This includes
(competitive) market prices. This departs from the standard formulation in the literature where
agents’ probability space is reduced from the outset to contain only exogenous (or ‘fundamen-
tal’) variables with prices being excluded from the probability space. In the standard formulation
this is possible because prices are assumed to be a function of exogenous fundamentals, and the
equilibrium pricing functions are assumed to be known to agents.2 The standard procedure thus
imposes a singularity in the joint density over market prices and fundamentals, with the singu-
1 Exceptions are models with private information, see Section 7.
2 This assumption is also made in the literature on ‘rational bubbles’, e.g., Santos and Woodford [32].
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implies that market outcomes carry only redundant information, so that agents do not need to
condition on prices to behave optimally.
Assuming the existence of a singularity in agents’ joint beliefs about prices and fundamentals,
however, appears to be in stark contrast with what academic economists seem to know about
the relation between prices and the observed history of fundamentals in the real world. This
manifests itself in the fact that empirical economists often fail to agree on a dominant explanation
for market price behavior and entertain competing models and explanations. In contrast to this,
agents in RE models have reached an agreement on the correct model for the market price in
period zero already. The existing uncertainty by expert economists suggests, however, to endow
agents in our models with similar uncertainty about how prices link with fundamentals.
We do so by allowing agents to entertain a non-degenerate joint density over future prices and
dividends, so that optimizing agents naturally need to condition decisions also on price realiza-
tions. Even though this is a potentially small departure from RE beliefs, we show that the model
outcome can be quite different.
The literature on adaptive learning previously studied models in which agents learn about
how to forecast future market outcomes. This literature, however, makes a number of ad-hoc
assumptions about agents’ behavior and learning mechanisms.3 As a result, the microfoundations
of adaptive learning models have not been carefully laid out, and it is unclear to what extent
agents in these models take rational decisions given the information they are assumed to possess.4
This generates controversy, specially in applications of models of learning to empirical work or
for policy analysis, as is the case in an increasing number of contributions.5
Our approach can be used to provide microfoundations to models of adaptive learning. Similar
to Muth [27], who showed how adaptive expectations can be compatible with the REH, we
demonstrate how ordinary least squares learning – a widely assumed learning rule in the adaptive
learning literature – arises as the optimal way to update conditional expectations from a complete
and dynamically consistent set of probability beliefs within a specific model.
To illustrate our approach for relaxing external rationality, we present a simple asset pricing
model with risk-neutral investors. We include heterogeneous agents and standard forms of market
incompleteness to insure that there exists a distinction between the agent’s own decision problem,
which we assume to be perfectly known, and market behavior, which we assume to be known
only imperfectly.
We first show – perhaps surprisingly – that the equilibrium stock price is then determined by
a one-step-ahead asset pricing equation. More precisely, the equilibrium stock price equals the
marginal investor’s discounted expected sum of the total stock payoff (price plus dividend) in
the next period. This differs from models with perfect market knowledge, where the equilibrium
price equals the discounted sum of future dividends. Our one-step-ahead equilibrium pricing
equation implies different market outcomes because the marginal agent’s expectations of tomor-
row’s price need not be related to the agent’s expectations about future dividends. Indeed, it can
3 We discuss these in detail in Section 2 below.
4 For example, the adaptive learning literature appeals to anticipated utility maximization in the sense of Kreps [22],
which is well known to be not dynamically consistent.
5 For example, Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4], Adam [2], Chakraborty and Evans [10], Cogley and Sargent [12],
Eusepi and Preston [14], Marcet and Nicolini [24], and Timmermann [35,36] use adaptive learning models to explain
data; Evans and Honkapohja [15–17], Molnar and Santoro [26], Orphanides and Williams [28] and Sargent [33] employ
such models for policy analysis.
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of dividends to be low – as long as the agent expects to be able to sell the stock at a higher price
tomorrow.6 The agent may reasonably expect to be able to do so if she holds the expectation that
the marginal agent tomorrow will hold more optimistic price and dividend expectations.
With imperfect market knowledge, beliefs about future prices thus become a crucial element
for determining today’s stock price. As a result, revisions in price beliefs add to the volatility of
stock prices. Moreover, if agents hold the view that prices differ from the discounted sum of div-
idends, then actual prices will do so, thereby supporting their initial view. Nevertheless, agents’
beliefs will differ from the objective probability distribution of prices. Yet, as we show, agents
cannot derive the objective distribution of prices through a deductive reasoning process if they
just know about their own dividend beliefs. This is possible only with additional information, for
example, if the preferences and beliefs of all agents are common knowledge.
Intuitively, the stock price ceases to be a discounted sum of dividends because imperfect
market knowledge (or alternatively lack of common knowledge of agents’ preferences and be-
liefs) leads to a failure of the law of iterated expectations. Since the identity of the marginal
agent that actually prices the stock is changing with time and because agents entertain heteroge-
neous beliefs, the equilibrium price is given by expectations evaluated under different probability
measures each period. As a result, agents cannot iterate forward on the one-step-ahead pricing
equation.7
A standard way to relax the strong informational assumptions underlying RE has been the
concept of Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium. This literature allows for imperfect infor-
mation about the density of exogenous variables (fundamentals) but it maintains the assumption
of perfect knowledge about the mapping from fundamentals to prices, thus assumes the existence
of a singularity in agents’ beliefs over prices and dividends. Bayesian RE equilibria thus deal with
uncertainty about fundamentals (dividends) and market outcomes (prices) in a rather asymmetric
way: while the process for fundamentals is imperfectly known, the contingent process for prices
is assumed to be known perfectly.
Studying Bayesian RE equilibria, Bray and Kreps [9] argued that it was unclear how much
information agents need to possess about the market for a Bayesian RE equilibrium to emerge.8
Section 4 of this paper can be interpreted as addressing this issue. In the context of our asset
pricing model, we show that a series of strong informational assumptions provide optimizing
agent with sufficient information to map the process for dividends into a single price outcome.
These assumptions endow the agent with a tremendous amount of additional knowledge about the
market, over and above what can be derived from internal rationality alone. Roughly speaking,
the Bayesian RE equilibrium emerges if all agents possess the same information as the theorist,
i.e., agents need to know all details about all other agents in the economy, including other agents’
probability beliefs, discount factors and so on, and all this needs to be common knowledge.
6 This is so because it is optimal to engage in speculative trading in the sense of Harrison and Kreps [21].
7 This feature also emerged in Allen, Morris and Shin [5], who study an asset pricing model with imperfect common
knowledge. In their setting, the one-step-ahead pricing equation emerges from the underlying two-period overlapping
generations framework and differential information across generations is sustained by introducing a noise trader assump-
tion. Both features together imply that one cannot easily iterate forward on the one-step-ahead pricing equations. While
Allen, Morris and Shin maintain RE in a model with private information, we depart from RE (by assuming imperfect
market knowledge) but derive the one-step-ahead pricing equation in a setting with infinitely lived investors. Preston [31]
also points out how imperfect market knowledge prevents the law of iterated expectations from giving a discounted sum
formulation of a budget constraint.
8 This point has been discussed more recently, for example, by Marimon [25] and Sargent [34].
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raises a number of issues. To many economists it may seem that the choice of agents’ beliefs must
be arbitrary. In Section 5.5 we provide a discussion of this issue, we argue that there is no arbi-
trariness in applications where i) the beliefs of agents are near-rational, ii) the market outcome
does not contradict agents’ beliefs in an obvious way and iii) if the modeler’s assumption about
agents’ beliefs is made in a reasonable way. Related to this, we end the paper by showing in Sec-
tion 6 that the REH does not prevent arbitrary outcomes: even when a Bayesian REE emerges,
the asset pricing predictions prove extremely sensitive to fine details in agents’ beliefs about the
dividend process. Based on this we conclude that agents’ prior beliefs may matter much more
than other economic factors for the behavior of equilibrium stock prices in a Bayesian RE equi-
librium. The pricing implications in Bayesian RE equilibrium models thus appear more arbitrary
than previously recognized.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present a list of unresolved issues in the
adaptive learning literature. In Section 3 we introduce a simple stock pricing model with incom-
plete markets and heterogeneous agents, we show how to introduce internal rationality, derive
investors’ optimality conditions, and define a competitive equilibrium with internally rational
agents. Section 4 compares our equilibrium concept to Bayesian RE equilibrium and shows how
agents’ market knowledge needs to be strengthened enormously in order for a discounted sum of
dividends and the Bayesian RE equilibrium to arise. Section 5 presents a consistent set of beliefs
where agents are uncertain about the mapping from dividends to prices. It shows how to entertain
small deviations from REE beliefs and how least-squares learning equations then emerge from an
optimal use of information in a specific case. Section 6 presents a formal result about the strong
sensitivity of the discounted sum of dividends to prior information about the dividend process.
Section 7 discusses some of the related literature. A conclusion summarizes.
2. Adaptive learning literature: open issues
The adaptive learning literature relaxes agents’ knowledge about the behavior of market deter-
mined variables but also makes a number of ad-hoc assumptions on agents’ behavior and learning
mechanisms. These give rise to important questions regarding the microfoundations of adaptive
learning models.
The source of the problem is as follows: the adaptive learning literature takes as point of depar-
ture the first order optimality conditions that emerge under the REH; it then replaces the rational
expectations operator E appearing in these optimality conditions by an operator of perceived ex-
pectations E˜; it then assumes that agents constantly re-estimate the parameters involved in these
perceived expectations in light of new data using some stochastic approximation algorithm.
One element of arbitrariness arises because first order conditions under the REH can be
written in many equivalent ways. One can then replace rational expectations by the subjective
operator E˜ in many different equations and, it turns out, depending on which version of the RE
formulation is used one can end up with rather different outcomes under learning.
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4], for example, consider an asset pricing model. They use a
one-step-ahead asset pricing equation Pt = δE˜t (Pt+1 + Dt+1) and show that a number of em-
pirical stock price puzzles can be explained if agents are learning about future price behavior.
By contrast Timmermann [36] and others set the stock price equal to expected discounted sum
of dividends, i.e., uses Pt = E˜t ∑∞j=1 δjDt+j , and studies learning about discounted dividends,
finding a much more muted impact on stock prices from learning behavior. Which is the ‘right’
way to set up the learning model?
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one-step-ahead Euler equations while Preston [31] showed that learning outcomes in a monetary
model differ when using the budget constraint to obtain a discounted sum formulation of the
optimality conditions. Again, which is the ‘right’ way to set up the learning model?
Another element of arbitrariness emerges because a large number of stochastic approximation
algorithms are available to formulate estimates of the parameters that determine agents’ percep-
tions E˜. The literature has used a range of stochastic approximation algorithms, e.g., ordinary
least squares learning, constant gain learning, or switching gain algorithms. Which is the ‘right’
way to model the response of expectations to new data?
Finally, while the perceptions E˜ are constantly evolving over time, agents behave as if their
current view will remain unchanged in the future, following the anticipated utility concept of
Kreps [22]. It is unclear whether this way of decision making will lead to an admissible plan in
the Bayesian sense, i.e., whether there exists at all a dynamically consistent subjective probability
measure under which the agents’ decisions resulting from this procedure are optimal.
Under the framework of this paper modeling choices are determined from rational behavior
of agents and the microeconomic specifications of the agent’s decision problem, including the
agents’ subjective beliefs about external variables. Surprisingly, it will turn out that some of the
short-cuts of the adaptive learning literature are less ad-hoc than might initially appear, and we
find that the one-step formulation of Adam Marcet and Nicolini [4] under OLS is optimal in
some specific models.
3. Internal rationality with imperfect market knowledge
This section introduces the concept of internal rationality, shows how to define agents’ prob-
ability space and defines and characterizes the competitive equilibrium with internal rationality.
To illustrate our approach we study a risk-neutral asset pricing model with heterogeneous
agents and incomplete markets. We choose such a model for its simplicity and because we obtain
very different pricing implications from the standard case with perfect market knowledge.
Agents in our model differ in their discount factor and in their subjective beliefs. Markets
are incomplete because of the existence of constraints that limit the amount of stocks investors
can buy or sell and because contingent claim markets are unavailable. The presence of investor
heterogeneity and market incompleteness allows us to distinguish between investors’ knowledge
of their own decision problem and their knowledge about market-determined variables, i.e., fu-
ture asset prices, which are also influenced by the discount factors and beliefs of other (possibly
different) investors.
3.1. Basic asset pricing model
The economy has t = 0,1,2, . . . periods and is populated by I infinitely-lived risk-neutral
investor types. There is a unit mass of investors of each type, all of them initially endowed with
1/I units of an infinitely lived stock. Agents of type i ∈ {1, . . . , I } have a standard time-separable
utility function
EP i0
∞∑(
δi
)t
Cit (1)t=0
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i
0
denotes the agent’s expectations in some probability space (Ω, S, P i ), where Ω is the space
of realizations, S the corresponding σ -algebra, and P i a subjective probability measure over
(Ω, S). As usual, the probability measure P i is a model primitive and given to agents. It is
allowed to be type-specific and, due to imperfect market knowledge, it may or may not coincide
with objective probabilities. The stocks Sit owned by agents represent claims to an infinitely
lived tree that yields each period Dt units of a perishable consumption good which are paid as
dividend.
The non-standard part in our formulation is in the underlying probability space. We consider
agents who view the process for {Pt ,Dt } as external to their decision problem and the probability
space over which they condition their choices is given by
Ω ≡ ΩP × ΩD
where ΩX = ∏∞t=0 R+ with X ∈ {P,D}. The probability space thus contains all possible se-
quences of prices and dividends. Letting S denote the sigma-algebra of all Borel subsets of Ω,
we assume that type i’s beliefs are given by a well-defined probability measure P i over (Ω, S).
As usual we denote the set of all possible dividend histories up to period t by ΩtD and we let
Dt ∈ ΩtD denote a typical dividend history. Using similar definitions for prices, the set of all his-
tories up to period t is given by Ωt = ΩtP × ΩtD and its typical element is denoted by ωt ∈ Ωt .
With this setup rational investors will condition their decisions on the history of observed
dividend and price realizations. This is a natural setup in a model of competitive behavior: since
investors see prices as a stochastic variable that is beyond their control and since prices influence
their budget constraint, investors want to condition their choices on the realization of prices, in
addition to the realization of dividends.
Note that we have endowed agents with a dynamically consistent set of subjective beliefs,
i.e., (Ω, S, P i ) is a proper probability space, P i satisfies all the standard probability axioms and
gives proper joint probabilities to all possible values of prices and dividends in any set of dates.
Moreover, although there is a time-invariant probability measure P i , our setup is general enough
to allow for agents that are learning about the stochastic processes of prices and dividends. For
example, P i could arise from a view that agents entertain about the stochastic processes describ-
ing the evolution of prices and dividends and by some prior beliefs about unknown parameters
of these processes. A particular example of this kind of subjective beliefs will be given in Sec-
tion 5.1.
Investors of type i choose consumption and stock holdings in period t, denoted by (Cit , Sit ),
contingent on the observed history ωt = (P t ,Dt ), i.e., investors choose a function(
Cit , S
i
t
) : Ωt → R2 (2)
for all t. The expected utility (1) associated with any such contingent consumption choice can
then be written as
EP i0
∞∑
t=0
(
δi
)t
Cit =
∫
Ω
∞∑
t=0
(
δi
)t
Cit
(
ωt
)
dP i (ω) (3)
The stock can be purchased and sold costlessly in a perfectly competitive spot market at ex-
dividend price Pt . Agent i thereby faces the following flow budget constraint
Cit + PtSit  (Pt + Dt)Si + ξ (4)t−1
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consumption goods, which is introduced for simplicity: it allows us to ignore non-negativity
constraints on consumption.9
Besides the budget constraint, consumers face the following limit constraints on stock hold-
ings:
Sit  0 (5)
Sit  S (6)
where 1 < S < ∞. Constraint (5) is a standard short-selling constraint and often used in the
literature. The second constraint (6) is a simplified form of a leverage constraint capturing the
fact that the consumer cannot buy arbitrarily large amounts of stocks. Constraint (6) helps to
insure existence of a maximum in the presence of risk neutral investors.
We are now in a position to define internal rationality within the current setting:
Definition 1 (Internal rationality). Agent i is internally rational if she chooses the functions (2)
to maximize expected utility (3) subject to the budget constraint (4), and the limit constraints (5)
and (6), taking as given the probability measure P i .
For more general settings, internal rationality requires that agents maximize their objective
function taking into account all relevant constraints, that they condition their actions on the his-
tory of all observable external variables, and that they evaluate the probability of future external
outcomes using a consistent set of subjective beliefs, which is given to them from the outset.
Within the context of the present model we assume that P i satisfies
EP i
[
Pt+1 + Dt+1
∣∣ ωt ]< ∞ for all ω, t, i (7)
and that a maximum of the investor’s utility maximization problem exists.10
3.2. Optimality conditions
Under internal rationality the space of outcomes Ω considered by agents includes all exter-
nal variables, i.e., the histories of prices and the history of dividends. Agents can thus assign a
consistent set of probabilities to all payoff relevant external events. Consequently, the first order
optimality conditions are found in a standard way. In particular, one of the following conditions
has to hold for all periods t and for almost all realizations in ωt ∈ Ωt :
Pt < δ
iEP it (Pt+1 + Dt+1) and Sit = S (8a)
Pt = δiEP it (Pt+1 + Dt+1) and Sit ∈ [0, S] (8b)
Pt > δ
iEP it (Pt+1 + Dt+1) and Sit = 0 (8c)
where EP it denotes the expectation conditional on ωt computed with the measure P i . Since the
objective function is concave and the feasible set is convex these equations determine necessary
conditions for the agent’s optimal investment decisions.
9 No substantial result depends on the fact that the non-negativity constraint on consumption is not binding.
10 Appendix A.1 shows that the existence of a maximum can be guaranteed by bounding the utility function. For
notational simplicity we treat the case with linear utility in the main text and assume existence of a maximum.
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day’s price and the expected price and dividend tomorrow. Therefore, to take optimal decisions
the agent only needs to know whether the observed realization ωt implies that the expected stock
return is higher, equal or lower than the inverse of the own discount factor. Since agents can
trade stocks in any period without transaction costs, the one-step-ahead optimality conditions (8)
deliver optimal investment choices, even if stocks can be held for an arbitrary number of periods.
Just to emphasize, it is not true that an internally rational agent has to compare today’s price
with the discounted sum of dividends in order to act optimally! Intuitively, our agents simply
try to ‘buy low and sell high’ as much as the stock holding constraints allow them. This is the
optimal strategy because it is optimal for agents to engage in speculative behavior in the sense of
Harrison and Kreps [21].
We show below that with imperfect market knowledge, an agent’s expectation of the future
price is not determined by the agent’s dividend expectations and internal rationality. The first
order conditions above, therefore, turn out to be equivalent to a discounted sum of dividend
formulation only in very special cases.
3.3. Standard belief formulation: a singularity
The setup for beliefs defined in the previous section differs from standard dynamic economic
modeling practice, which imposes additional restrictions on beliefs. Specifically, the standard
belief specification assumes that agents formulate probability beliefs only over the reduced state
space ΩD and that agents’ choices are contingent on the history of dividends only. Agents are
then endowed with the knowledge that each realization Dt ∈ ΩtD is associated with a given level
of the stock price Pt , which amounts to endowing agents with knowledge of a function
Pt : ΩtD → R+ (9)
The probabilities for the price process are then constructed from knowledge of this function and
beliefs over ΩD. Once this function is observed prices carry only redundant information, there
is no need to condition choices on the history of prices and there is no loss in optimality by ex-
cluding prices from the state space. Clearly, knowledge of the function (9) represents knowledge
regarding market outcomes: agents know exactly which market outcome is going to be associated
with a particular history of fundamentals.
This standard belief specification can thus be interpreted as a special case of the formulation
outlined in the previous section, namely one where P i is assumed to impose a degeneracy be-
tween pairs (P t ,Dt ). In contrast, our more general belief formulation outlined in Section 3.1
allows agents to be uncertain about the relation between prices and dividends.
The standard formulation using degenerate beliefs is consistent with the rational expectations
equilibrium outcome, so no loss of generality is implied by imposing the singularity in P i from
the outset under the REH. But as we will show in Sections 3.5 and 4 below, knowledge of this
singularity is not a consequence of agents’ ability to maximize their utility or to behave rationally
given their subjective beliefs. Instead, it is the result of a set of strong assumptions that imply
that agents know from the outset how the market works. Indeed, a sufficient condition for agents
to work out the equilibrium price function will be that agents know the market so well that they
are able to map each potential future dividend sequence into a single value for the stock price.
Given that such a relationship between dividends and prices remains fairly elusive to academic
economists – these still entertain a range of alternative asset pricing models each of which implies
a different function Pt – it seems equally reasonable to consider agents who are also not fully
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thus naturally modeled by allowing agents to entertain beliefs about the joint process for prices
and dividends that does not impose a singularity.
3.4. Internally rational expectations equilibrium (IREE)
This section considers the process for competitive equilibrium prices with internally rational
agents and defines an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium (IREE).
We propose a competitive equilibrium definition that is as close as possible to the standard
formulation. The definition below is specific to our stock pricing model but is easily extended
to more general setups. Let (ΩD, SD, PD) be a probability space with ΩD denoting the space
of dividend histories and PD the ‘objective’ probability measure for dividends. Let ωD ∈ ΩD
denote a typical infinite history of dividends.
Definition 2 (IREE). An Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium (IREE) consists of a se-
quence of equilibrium price functions {Pt }∞t=0 where Pt : ΩtD → R+ for each t , contingent
choices {Cit , Sit }∞t=0 of the form (2) and probability beliefs P i for each agent i, such that
(1) all agents i = 1, . . . , I are internally rational, and
(2) when agents evaluate {Cit , Sit } at equilibrium prices, markets clear for all t and all ωD ∈ ΩD
almost surely in PD .
Verbally, an IREE is a competitive equilibrium allowing for the possibility that agents’ sub-
jective density about future prices and dividends is not necessarily equal to the objective density.
Or equivalently, it is an equilibrium in which agents are internally rational but not necessarily
externally rational.
Quite a few papers have previously studied Arrow–Debreu (AD) models in which agents’
subjective probability densities about fundamentals may not coincide with the actual densities of
the fundamentals.11 It is important to note that an IREE is not a special case of this literature. The
reason is that in the AD framework embodies two basic features: i) any physical good is treated as
a different good if delivered in a different period or for a different realization; ii) agents observe
the equilibrium prices for all goods. These two features together imply that the equilibrium price
function (9) is known to agents. We consider cases where the singularity in beliefs is absent
because there does not exist a full set of contingent claim markets.
We now determine the equilibrium price mappings Pt in the above asset pricing model. Equi-
librium prices will depend on standard microeconomic fundamentals such as utility functions,
discount factors, and dividend beliefs, but also on agents’ price beliefs given by the probabil-
ity measures P i . Moreover, since agents do not necessarily hold rational price expectations, we
need to distinguish between the stochastic process for equilibrium prices Pt and agents’ perceived
price process Pt . The first order conditions (8) imply that the asset is held by the agent type with
the most optimistic beliefs about the discounted expected price and dividend in the next period.12
11 See Blume and Easley [8] for a recent application.
12 This emerges because we assume S > 1 so that the constraint (6) never binds in equilibrium. Extensions to the case
with S < 1 are straightforward.
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Pt = max
i∈I
[
δiEP it (Pt+1 + Dt+1)
] (10)
The next section discusses, whether agents could deduce the equilibrium price function (10) from
the information that is available to them.
3.5. Is internal rationality sufficient to derive a singularity in beliefs?
The equilibrium price function Pt : ΩtD → R+ emerging in an IREE is indeed a function of
the history of dividends only. This implies that the objective density over prices and dividends
features a singularity. In light of these observations it is natural to ask whether knowledge that
this singularity exists would be sufficient to allow internally rational agents to compute the cor-
rect equilibrium price functions through a process of deductive reasoning. Or equivalently, does
internal rationality imply external rationality if agents know that dividends are the only source of
fundamental disturbances?
The answer to both of these questions turns out to be ‘no’. As we show below, the problem
is that knowledge of the existence of a degeneracy falls short of informing agents about its exact
location. This holds true even if the equilibrium asset pricing equation (10) is common knowl-
edge to all agents. This in turn provides a natural interpretation for why agents’ beliefs might
not contain a singularity, even though in the model the objective density possesses a singularity:
agents are simply uncertain about the correct model linking stock prices to the history of divi-
dends, and they express this uncertainty using a non-degenerate system of beliefs P i over prices
and dividends.
We now show that the singularity is not easily located. Let mt : ΩtD → {1, . . . , I } denote the
marginal agent pricing the asset in period t in equilibrium14:
mt = arg max
i∈I
[
δiEP it (Pt+1 + Dt+1)
] (11)
Clearly the equilibrium price (10) can thus be written as
Pt = δmtEPmtt (Pt+1 + Dt+1) (12)
We now suppose that agents know that the equilibrium price satisfies Eq. (12) each period and
that this is common knowledge.15 Doing so endows agents with a considerable amount of infor-
mation about how the market prices the asset. Specifically, common knowledge implies that each
agent knows that other agents know that the asset is priced according to (12) each period, that
each agents knows that other agents know that others know it to be true, and so on to infinity.16
13 Since expectations EP it are conditional on the realization Pt , the equilibrium price affects both sides of the expression
above and, at this level of generality, it is unclear whether there always exists an equilibrium price Pt for any given
dividend history Dt or whether it is unique, see also the discussion in Adam [1]. At this point, we proceed by simply
assuming existence and uniqueness, we leave this issue for further research. See footnote 21 for a discussion of existence
and uniqueness in the specific asset pricing model that we consider.
14 If the argmax is non-unique we can use a selection criterion from among all marginal agents. For example, we can
take mt to be the marginal agent with the lowest index i.
15 Internally rational agents do not need to have such knowledge to behave optimally conditional on their beliefs.
16 See Aumann [7] for a formal definition.
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holds
Pt = δmtEPmtt (Pt+1 + Dt+1) (13)
and that each agent has price and dividend beliefs P i that are consistent with this equation. The
question we are posing is: would common knowledge of Eq. (13) allow internally rational agents
to impose restrictions on price beliefs as a function of their beliefs about dividends? Would it
allow agents to determine a singularity?
Common knowledge of Eq. (13) allows agents to iterate forward on this equation, say T times,
to find
Pt = δmtEPmtt (Dt+1)
+ δmtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1 Dt+2
)
+ δmtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1
(
δmt+2EP
mt+2
t+2 Dt+3
))+ · · ·
+ δmtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1
(· · · δmt+T EPmt+Tt+T (Pt+T +1 + Dt+T +1))) (14)
The last three lines of the right-hand side of this equation provide an alternative expression
for agents’ discounted expectations of next period’s price. They show that knowledge of (13)
implies that agents’ price expectations are given by their beliefs about which agents are going
to be marginal in the future and by their beliefs about what beliefs future marginal agents will
hold about future dividends and the terminal price. Since agent i is not marginal in all periods
and since agent i can rationally believe other agents to hold rather different beliefs, own beliefs
about dividends fail to restrict the beliefs agent i can entertain about prices. For example, agent i
can believe the future discounted sum of dividends to be low but at the same time believe the
future price to be high – all that is required is that the agent believes future marginal agents to be
relatively more optimistic about future dividends and prices.
In the literature, the discounted sum of dividends is usually obtained by applying the law
of iterated expectations on the right side of Eq. (14). This can be done whenever all conditional
expectations are with respect to the same probability measure, e.g., if mt is constant through time.
In our model mt is random whenever P i assigns positive probability to the event that the agent
may not be marginal at some point in the future. If in addition the agent believes that other agents
hold different (price and dividend) beliefs, then the law of iterated expectations cannot be applied
to (14).17 Price expectations then fail to be determined by agents’ dividend expectations. This
shows that own dividend beliefs, knowledge of (13), and internal rationality are not sufficient
conditions for agents’ beliefs P i to contain a specific singularity where prices are equal to a
discounted sum of dividends. The next section explores this issue further by actually providing
sufficient additional conditions under which internally rational agents would have to incorporate
such a singularity.
4. Bayesian rational expectations equilibrium
This section derives sufficient conditions that would allow internally rational agents to impose
the ‘correct’ singularity in their subjective beliefs P i over prices and dividends, as it emerges in
17 Allen, Morris and Shin [5] and Preston [31] make a similar point in different models.
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tion Pt , agents require a tremendous amount of information about the market. This confirms
conjectures expressed previously by Bray and Kreps [9] regarding the strong informational re-
quirements underlying Bayesian REE models.
We start by providing a definition of a Bayesian REE. While our definition is stated in terms
of our previous definition of an IREE, the resulting equilibrium notion nevertheless agrees with
that provided in most of the literature.
Definition 3 (Bayesian REE). A Bayesian Rational Expectations Equilibrium is an Internally
Rational Expectations Equilibrium in which agents’ subjective beliefs P i are consistent with the
equilibrium price function Pt , i.e.
ProbP i
(
Pt = Pt
∣∣Dt)= 1
for all t,ω, i.
Verbally, a Bayesian REE is an IREE in which all agents associate with each possible partial
dividend history the correct equilibrium price. The term ‘Bayesian’ in this definition reflects the
fact that agents’ knowledge about the dividend process is allowed to be imperfect. For example,
agents may be uncertain about some of the parameters in the law of motion of dividends. When
all agents know the true process for dividends, then the Bayesian REE simplifies further to a
standard REE.
We now provide sufficient conditions on P i so that the IREE reduces to a Bayesian REE. As
in the previous section, we start by endowing agents with knowledge of how the market prices
the asset for all periods t and all states ω:
Assumption 1. It is common knowledge that Eq. (13) holds for all t and all ω ∈ Ω .
This allows agents to iterate on the equilibrium asset price equation (13) to obtain Eq. (14).
Importantly, agents cannot iterate on their own first order optimality conditions because these do
not always hold with equality.
The discounted sum expression (14) still contains expectations about the terminal price Pt+T .
To eliminate price expectations altogether, one thus needs to impose that all agents know that the
equilibrium asset price satisfies a ‘no-rational-bubble’ requirement:
Assumption 2. It is common knowledge that
lim
T →∞ δ
mtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1
(· · · δmt+T EPmt+Tt+T (Pt+T )))= 0
for all t and all ω ∈ Ω .
Assumption 2 again provides information about the market: all agents know that marginal
agents expect future marginal agents to expect (and so on to infinity) that prices grow at a rate
less than the corresponding discount factors. In the case with homogeneous expectations and
discount factors this requirement reduces to the familiar condition:
lim EPt
(
δT Pt+T
)= 0 (15)
T →∞
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of how the market prices the asset asymptotically, it does not just arise from rational behavior.
Assumption 2 allows to take the limit T → ∞ in Eq. (13) and to abstract from expectations
about the terminal selling price to obtain:
Pt = δmtEPmtt (Dt+1)
+ δmtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1 Dt+1
)
+ δmtEPmtt
(
δmt+1EP
mt+1
t+1
(
δmt+2EP
mt+2
t+2 Dt+2
))
+ · · · (16)
One thus obtains an expression for the asset price in terms of the expected discounted sum of
marginal agents’ expectations of future marginal agents dividend expectations, and so on. Agents
may, however, still entertain a range of views about who will be marginal in the future and what
the dividend expectations of such marginal agents are going to be. Assumptions 1–2 are thus
still not sufficient for rational agents to associate a single equilibrium price with each dividend
history Dt ∈ ΩtD .
For Eq. (16) to impose a singularity, agents have to believe in a given mapping mt : ΩtD →{1, . . . , I } and they must know the discount factor δi and the probability measure P i for all other
agents i. Only then can a rational agent use Eq. (16) and the own beliefs about the dividend
process to evaluate the right side of (16), i.e., can associate a single price outcome with any
dividend history Dt .
Furthermore, in a Bayesian REE the resulting price beliefs must be objectively true given the
dividend history. This fails to be the case if agents employ an arbitrary mapping mt . Therefore,
agents must employ the mapping mt that is objectively true in equilibrium! Letting mt : ΩtD →{1,2, . . . , I } denote this equilibrium mapping, we need
Assumption 3. The equilibrium functions mt for all t , the discount factors δi and the probability
measures P i for all i are known to all agents.
Clearly, Assumption 3 incorporates a tremendous amount of knowledge about the market:
agents need to know for each possible dividend history which agent is marginal, what is the
marginal agent’s discount factor, and the marginal agent’s belief system. Only then can agents
impose the correct singularity (16) on their joint beliefs about the behavior of prices and divi-
dends.
The simplest and most common way in the literature to impose Assumptions 1–3 is to consider
the leading asset pricing example, i.e., a representative agent model with sequentially complete
markets and price beliefs that satisfy the no-rational-bubble requirement (15). If the represen-
tative agent knows that she is marginal at all times and contingencies, her first order condition
holds with equality at all periods. She can then iterate on it and evaluate future expectations by
applying the law of iterated expectations to own beliefs. In this specific case, internal rationality
(plus Assumption 2) implies equality between the equilibrium asset price and the discounted sum
of dividends. The leading asset price example may thus erroneously suggest that the equality be-
tween the market clearing asset price and the expected discounted sum of dividends is a natural
outcome of internally rational investment behavior, but clearly this is not true more generally.
Indeed, the commonly made assumption that the agent ‘knows to be marginal at all times’ is
an indirect way to make Assumption 3, i.e., an assumption that appears rather unnatural when
allowing for heterogeneity and incomplete markets. Since homogeneous agent models are best
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know that they are marginal at each time should be as unappealing as making Assumption 3.
The fact that strong assumptions have to be imposed for the REH to emerge raises the im-
portant question of how agents could have possibly acquired such detailed knowledge about the
working of the market? Given that equilibrium prices do not even come close to revealing the
underlying process for market microeconomic fundamentals (mt , δi and P i ), it is hard to see
how an agent could possibly be certain from the outset about the relation between dividends and
prices. Given this, it seems to us worthwhile to pursue the concept of IREE, where agents do not
know the equilibrium pricing function from the outset.
5. Asset pricing with imperfect market knowledge
This section presents a specific example showing how one can slightly relax the strong mar-
ket knowledge assumptions underlying a Bayesian REE. The example is of interest because it
shows – perhaps surprisingly – that for some models the standard approach taken in the adaptive
learning literature, as discussed in Section 2, can be consistent with internal rationality. Specif-
ically, we show that the asset pricing model in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4], which uses a
one-step-ahead pricing equation and replaces the expectations operator in this equation by a least
squares learning algorithm, can be derived from a model with internally rational agents whose
prior beliefs are close to the RE beliefs. This is important because the learning model explored in
Adam, Marcet and Nicolini gives rise to equilibrium prices dynamics that quantitatively replicate
a wide range of asset pricing facts within a very simple setup.
The model below abstracts from heterogeneity amongst agents and considers instead a model
with homogeneous agents. Heterogeneity was useful in the previous section to highlight that
in realistic models a huge amount of market knowledge is required for agents to deduce market
outcomes and for a Bayesian REE to arise, but heterogeneity is not crucial for the characterization
in this section. All we require is that homogeneity amongst agents fails to be common knowledge,
so that agents cannot deduce the market outcome from what they know.18
We start by determining the REE, then show how one can relax slightly the singularity in prior
beliefs that agents are assumed to entertain in the REE. Finally, we show how Bayesian learning
about the price process gives rise to the ordinary least squares (OLS) learning equations assumed
in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4].
5.1. Perfect knowledge benchmark (REE)
We consider risk neutral agents who share the same beliefs and the same discount factor δ.
The true process for dividends is assumed to follow
logDt/Dt−1 = loga + log εt (17)
with a > 0, log εt ∼ iiN(0, σ 2) and D−1 > 0 given. Log dividends thus grow at the rate loga on
average and dividend growth innovations are unpredictable. When the dividend process (17) and
homogeneity of agents is common knowledge, i.e., if agents know all relevant features of other
18 Alternatively, the homogeneous agent model below could be interpreted as an approximation to the solution of a
heterogeneous agent model in which the degree of heterogeneity is vanishing but where vanishing heterogeneity fails to
be common knowledge.
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REE outcome, i.e.,
P REt =
δaeσ
2/2
1 − δaeσ 2/2 Dt
The RE equilibrium price process thus evolves according to
logP REt /P REt−1 = loga + log εt (18)
so that prices grow at the same rate as dividends. The stochastic innovation in the price growth
process is thereby the same as in the dividend growth process, illustrating the existence of a sin-
gularity in the joint evolution of prices and dividends. While it is well known that these aspects of
the REE solution are empirically unappealing, our discussion in Section 3 about market knowl-
edge suggests that they may be equally unappealing on theoretical grounds. The next section
relaxes agents’ knowledge about the stochastic processes (17) and (18).
5.2. Imperfect knowledge: relaxing REE priors
We now relax the assumption that homogeneity of agents is common knowledge. Instead we
assume that agents have imperfect knowledge about other agents’ preferences and beliefs. The
discussion in Sections 3 and 4 show that this allows us to consider internally rational agents that
hold subjective beliefs P which differ from the ones they are assumed to entertain in the REE.
We also how one can choose agents’ beliefs to be arbitrarily close to REE beliefs.
Specifically, we assume that agents believe prices and dividends to evolve according to the
following process[ logPt/Pt−1
logDt/Dt−1
]
=
[ logβP
logβD
]
+
[ log εPt
log εDt
]
(19)
for given (P−1,D−1) and with(
log εPt , log εDt
)′ ∼ iiN(0,Σ)
Σ =
[
σ 2P σPD
σPD σ
2
D
]
This specification allows for different growth rates of prices and dividends and for innovations
to prices and dividends that are only imperfectly correlated. Unlike Section 5.1 we now consider
agents who are uncertain about the mean growth rates of prices (logβP ) and dividends (logβD)
and about the covariance matrix of innovations (Σ ). We capture agents’ uncertainty at time zero
by prior beliefs about these unknown parameters and summarize these by a probability density
function(
logβP , logβD,Σ
)∼ f
The prior beliefs f together with the laws of motion (19) fully determine agents’ probability
measure P over infinite sequences of price and dividends realizations.19
19 Given this structure, the probabilities assigned by P can be obtained as follows: for any Borel subset s ⊂ S , determine
the likelihood of prices and dividends being in s for any given value of (logβP , logβD,Σ) using standard methods for
Markov processes applied to Eq. (19). Then integrate these probabilities over values of (logβP , logβD,Σ) according
to f .
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special case when the prior f assigns probability one to the outcome
βP = βD = a, Σ = σ 2
(
1 1
1 1
)
We call this the ‘RE prior’ and let PRE denote the associated probability measure over sequences
of prices and dividends. The singularity in this measure shows up in the form of a singular
covariance matrix Σ .
We now relax these RE priors slightly. The relaxation gives rise to an alternative probability
measure P without a singularity in the joint density over prices and dividends. We also explain
what we mean by a ‘small deviation from REE beliefs’.
In the interest of obtaining closed form solutions for the evolution of the posterior beliefs, we
use a conjugate prior specification for f that is of the Normal–Wishart form. Specifically, we
consider prior beliefs of the form
H ∼ W(S0, n0) (20a)(
logβP , logβD
)′ ∣∣H = h ∼ N((logβP0 , logβD0 )′, (ν0h)−1) (20b)
for given parameters logβP0 , logβ
D
0 , ν0, S0 and n0. The Wishart distribution W with variance–
covariance matrix S0 and n0 > 1 degrees of freedom specifies agents’ marginal prior about the
inverse of the variance covariance matrix of innovations H ≡ Σ−1, where n0 scales the preci-
sion of prior beliefs. The normal distribution N specifies agents’ priors about the parameters
(logβP , logβD) conditional on the precision matrix H being equal to h, where (logβP0 , logβ
D
0 )
denotes the conditional prior mean and ν0 > 0 scales the precision of prior beliefs about
(logβP , logβD).
We further restrict our attention to prior beliefs such that(
βP0 , β
D
0
)= (a, a) (21)
S0 = σ 2
(
1 1 − κ
1 − κ 1
)
(22)
This implies that agents’ beliefs are initially centered at the REE. Moreover, in the limiting
case with vanishing prior uncertainty (n0, ν0 → ∞ with n0/v0 → 1) and perfectly correlated
innovations (κ → 0) the resulting beliefs P converge in distribution to P RE. In other words, we
have weak convergence to RE beliefs. It is in this precise sense that for large (n0, ν0), small κ
and initial values given by Eqs. (21) and (22), agents’ beliefs P involve only a ‘small deviation
from REE beliefs’.
The next section determines the equilibrium asset prices implied by the beliefs P .
5.3. Internally rational expectations equilibrium
When all agents’ beliefs are given by P , it follows from Eqs. (13) and (19) that the equilibrium
asset price is given by
Pt = δEPt (Pt+1 + Dt+1)
= δEPt
(
elogβ
P
elog ε
P
t+1
)
Pt + δEPt
(
elogβ
D
elog ε
D
t+1
)
Dt (23)
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X
t+1
(for X ∈ {P,D}). The next section determines the evolution of these conditional expectations
over time and shows that they can be described by ordinary least squares (OLS) learning rules.
5.4. Bayesian updating and OLS learning
We now show that for the beliefs specified in the previous sections, optimal belief updating in
an IREE gives rise to the least squares learning equations that have been typically studied in the
adaptive learning literature.
We start by determining the posterior beliefs for logβP , logβD and Σ . We thereby use the
fact that our prior specification (20) is conjugate, so that the posterior in period t is again of the
Normal–Wishart form (20).20 The posterior is given by
H | ωt ∼ W(St , nt ) (24a)(
logβP , logβD
)′ ∣∣H = h, ωt ∼ N((logβPt , logβDt )′, (νth)−1) (24b)
where the parameters (logβPt , logβDt , νt , St , nt ) evolve recursively as follows:( logβPt+1
logβDt+1
)
=
( logβPt
logβDt
)
+ 1
νt + 1et (25a)
νt+1 = νt + 1 (25b)
S−1t+1 = S−1t +
νt
νt + 1et e
′
t (25c)
nt+1 = nt + 1 (25d)
with et denoting the one-step-ahead ‘forecast error’:
et =
(
log Pt
Pt−1 − logβPt
log Dt
Dt−1 − logβDt
)
Letting ‘≈’ denote an approximation that is correct up to first order, Appendix A.2 shows that the
posterior beliefs imply that the conditional expectations appearing in the pricing equation (23)
are given by
EPt
(
elogβ
P
eσ
2
P /2
)≈ β̂Pt (26)
with β̂Pt denoting the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate of stock price growth given by
β̂Pt ≡
1
t + ν0
t∑
j=1
Pj
Pj−1
+ ν0
t + ν0 β
P
0
Note that the OLS estimator incorporates the prior βP0 by treating it like ν0 observations of stock
price growth in the data. Similar approximations for dividend expectations yield
20 The subsequent result follows from Theorem 1, Chapter 9.10 in DeGroot [13]. Our variables can be mapped into the
ones employed in DeGroot’s theorem using: h → r , H → R, nt → α, S−1t → τ , (logβPt , logβPt )′ → μ, νt → ν. Unlike
DeGroot, we parameterize Normal and Wishart distributions using variance–covariance matrices rather than precision
matrices, as this has become more common nowadays.
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(
elogβ
D
eσ
2
D/2
)≈ β̂Dt ≡ 1t + ν0
t∑
i=0
Di
Di−1
+ ν0
t + ν0 β
D
0
so that the pricing equation (23) implies – up to a first order approximation of conditional expec-
tations – that
Pt = δβ̂Pt Pt + δβ̂Dt Dt (27)
or, equivalently
Pt = δβ̂
D
t
1 − δβ̂Pt
Dt (28)
This is the equation studied by Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4]. This equation clearly says that
learning about price growth behavior influences equilibrium stock prices in a model with inter-
nally rational agents who hold a complete and consistent set of probability beliefs. Specifically,
it is clear that higher expected price growth β̂Pt implies a higher price–dividend ratio and this is
what generates the price dynamics studied in that paper.21
5.5. Specifying agents’ beliefs
Our definitions of internal rationality and Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium
(IREE) take agents’ beliefs P as exogenously given. This allows to formulate simple micro-
foundations and to apply standard dynamic modeling tools. It also reflects the fact that – once
one departs from the REH – agents’ beliefs P inevitably become part of the microfoundations of
the model and thus a choice variable for the economic modeler. In contrast, when working under
the REH, agents’ beliefs P are largely dictated by the remaining microfoundations of the model,
so that economic modelers typically do not have to specify agents’ beliefs.22 While the REH
simplifies model construction enormously, we have argued that this way of specifying beliefs
may not be the most plausible one: it incorporates a singularity into agents’ beliefs that contains
so much information about market behavior that not even expert economists can plausibly claim
to possess.
When departing from the REH, one inevitably has to specify agents’ beliefs; and this endows
the economic modeler with additional degrees of freedom. While these could be used in an un-
fruitful way, it is equally possible that economists will learn to employ these degrees of freedom
productively. In this section we offer some preliminary comments on belief selection – most of
the issues we address are still part of ongoing research.
To avoid arbitrary belief specifications, it appears desirable when specifying agents’ belief
systems to incorporate some concept of near-rationality with respect to the resulting equilibrium
outcomes.
21 Eq. (28) reveals that existence of an equilibrium price requires that the (approximate) posterior mean for expected
price growth β̂Pt remains below δ−1. In Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4] this condition is insured by imposing an ad-hoc
continuous projection facility on beliefs, which bounded mean price growth expectations below δ−1. We conjecture that
this can be obtained from a consistent system of beliefs P by truncating the upper tail of the prior density f for the
unknown parameter logβP . Also, since the equilibrium price Pt affects the left- and right-hand side of Eq. (28) there
may actually exist multiple or no mutually consistent equilibrium price and belief pairs. To avoid this, the estimate β̂Pt
in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4] is computed using prices up to period t − 1 only. Adam and Marcet [3] provide an
information structure where such delayed updating arises from fully Bayesian updating behavior in a setting where agents
nevertheless observe contemporaneous prices and dividends.
22 Exceptions arise whenever the RE equilibrium fails to be unique, as is the case in many monetary models, for example.
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to REE beliefs, as discussed in Section 5.2. Studying such small deviations from REE beliefs
appears of interest because anyone willing to assign to agents the REE beliefs should be equally
willing to explore the consequences of endowing agents with small deviations from such beliefs.
This is especially true if such small deviations are associated with a considerable improvement
in the empirical performance of the model, as shown in Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4]. In the
present model, this feature also insures that agents’ beliefs are close to the resulting equilibrium
outcomes because the equilibrium outcomes are continuous with respect to agents’ beliefs.
More generally, one might ask whether decision makers maintain a system of beliefs P , as we
assumed, if they observe equilibrium prices that have a distribution different from P? This can
only be expected if the belief system P is not too obviously wrong after observations of the actual
equilibrium outcomes in the model are available. This is the case, if beliefs and actual outcomes
are close (in distribution), or if agents’ beliefs converge over time to such a situation, or if agents
even learn over time to make RE predictions. In the latter case, agents would realize in the long
run that their beliefs are correct and thus have no incentive to change their belief system P .
For the homogeneous agent version of the asset pricing model considered in this paper, Adam,
Marcet and Nicolini [4] show that least squares learning converges globally and almost surely to
RE. Therefore, agents in the setup studied in this paper will not change the model on which they
are basing their beliefs after observing the equilibrium outcomes for a large number of periods.
Belief systems P are unlikely to be kept for long, however, if they assign zero likelihood to
outcomes that agents can actually observe in equilibrium. The observation of zero probability
(more precisely, zero density) events would tell agents that their belief systems are incompatible
with the observed equilibrium path and it should induce reasonable agents to immediately ad-
just their beliefs. In the present paper, we avoided this problem by specifying beliefs that have
full support over all outcomes, therefore, any combination of prices and dividends has positive
density.23
Future research might show that other features could also give rise to unattractive belief sys-
tems. Indeed, determining what constitutes acceptable belief specifications promises to be an
exciting avenue for further research.24
Macroeconomists sometimes appear reluctant to consider relaxations of the REH. This may
partly be motivated by the fear that economists could then start choosing belief systems for their
models that appear unattractive when compared to the equilibrium implications they generate. We
propose to interpret such outcomes simply as bad modeling choices, something that can happen
in all aspects of economic modeling, e.g., even when it comes to choosing utility functions. While
economists could make unreasonable utility specifications, this does not imply that the task of
specifying appropriate utility functions would not be useful: important progress has been made,
for example, by showing which preference specifications are consistent with the Kaldor facts.
Similar progress appears possible when it comes to determining appropriate belief systems.
23 Some of the literature employing ‘near-rational’ or ‘robust’ belief systems, e.g., Woodford [38] or Hansen and Sar-
gent [20], have avoided such inconsistencies by requiring that near-rational beliefs are absolutely continuous with respect
to the equilibrium outcomes.
24 For example, we find it equally acceptable in our model to assume that agents use a constant gain learning algorithm
instead of the OLS learning equations. This would be an IREE if the belief system is as specified in Section 5.2 but has
time-varying parameters (logβP , logβD) in the law of motion (19), with these parameters following independent unit
root processes. As long as the variance of the innovation in the unit root processes also becomes arbitrarily small, the
implied constant gain becomes small and we still have weak convergence in distribution to REE beliefs.
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Discipline can be imposed, not only by restricting agents to be near-rational, but also by using the
many available sources of indirect data on expectations, including survey evidence and financial
market data which is closely linked to investors’ expectations.
6. Sensitivity of Bayesian REE asset prices
This section demonstrates that the asset price in a Bayesian REE is extremely sensitive to
fine details in the specification of agents’ prior beliefs about dividend growth. Indeed, details of
agents’ prior beliefs about dividend growth matter much more for asset prices than the microeco-
nomic structure of the economy. Since economists will probably never find out about details on
the prior, this represents a degree of freedom in Bayesian REE modeling that strongly influences
the Bayesian REE asset price.
For simplicity, we consider again a homogeneous agent model in which all agents hold the
same discount factor and dividend beliefs and where this is common knowledge. Each internally
rational agent can then deduce the Bayesian REE asset price associated with any history of
dividends. This price is given by
Pt = EP
(
lim
T →∞
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
(29)
but turns out to be extremely sensitive with respect to the prior beliefs about the dividend process
incorporated in P . Specifically, as we show in Proposition 2 below, the equilibrium price can
be increased by any desired amount by simply reallocating an arbitrarily small amount of prior
probability mass.
To illustrate this point we rewrite the dividend process as
Dt = aDt−1ηt (30)
where ηt > 0 is i.i.d. with E[ηt ] = 1 and a > 0.25 Agents’ prior density about a is denoted by f
and satisfies f (˜a) = 0 for all a˜  0. The posterior density about a conditional on any observed
history Dt is denoted by Postt .
The following proposition provides a first result. It shows that unless the posterior beliefs
about dividend growth are bounded by the inverse of the discount factor, equilibrium prices are
infinite. The proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 1. Consider the Bayesian REE asset price (29). For any t and Dt :
1. If Postt (a  δ−1) > 0, then
Pt = ∞
2. Let B denote the upper bound of the support of Postt . If B < δ−1 then
Pt = DtEPostt
(
δa
1 − δa
)
< ∞ (31)
25 The parameter a in the equation above is not exactly equal to the one employed in Eq. (17), but this is of no importance
for the results that follow.
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mermann [30], but also differs because it does not rely on parametric forms for the prior beliefs.26
This will prove useful below for showing that the sensitivity of prices to priors is a general phe-
nomenon.
Proposition 1 above shows that the asset price is finite whenever the support of the posterior
density is bounded below δ−1. This can be insured, for example, by choosing prior beliefs f
with an upper bound of the support B < δ−1. The posterior beliefs will then inherit this property.
This in turn might suggest that Bayesian REE asset prices cannot be arbitrarily high provided
one imposes an upper bound B < δ−1 on the support of prior dividend growth beliefs. Yet, the
following proposition, which is proven in Appendix A.3, shows that this fails to be true:
Proposition 2. Consider a prior density f with upper bound B < δ−1 for its support. There
exists a sequence of densities {f k} with upper bound Bk < δ−1 and ∫ |f k − f | → 0 such that
the Bayesian REE price implied by f k converges to infinity as k → ∞.
Bounding the prior support is thus not a very robust solution to the problem for the high
sensitivity of Bayesian REE asset prices: given any prior that implies bounded prices, there exists
another prior that is arbitrarily close to it and that gives rise to prices that are arbitrarily large.
Due to a (well-acknowledged) shortcut this sensitivity of Bayesian REE asset prices some-
times failed to show up in some of the Bayesian REE literature. Timmermann [35,36], for
example, ignores the posterior uncertainty about a and uses instead only the posterior mean
for a to evaluate the discounted sum in Eq. (29) to set
Pt = Dt δEPostt (a)1 − δEPostt (a)
where
EPostt (a) =
∞∫
0
a˜Postt (˜a) da˜
so that only the posterior mean matters for equilibrium prices. As should be clear from the results
in this section, this shortcut can strongly alter the asset pricing implications.27
7. Relation to the literature
The concept of an Internally Rational Expectations Equilibrium (IREE) developed in this
paper is a generalization of the Bayesian REE concept. The latter emerges as a special case of
IREE when agents possess sufficient knowledge about the market so that they can deduce the
equilibrium market outcome associated with any possible sequence of fundamentals.
The IREE is also related to the private information REE analyzed in Allen, Morris and
Shin [5]. Both equilibrium concepts relax the common knowledge assumptions of standard mod-
els, in the case of Allen, Morris and Shin due to the assumption of private information, in our case
26 The result in Proposition 1 also differs from the examples in Geweke [19] and Weitzman [37] where non-existence
of expected utility does not arise from a diverging infinite discounted sum. Instead, in these papers one-period-ahead
expected consumption utility already fails to be finite.
27 Similarly, Pastor and Veronesi [29] assume a finite asset price after some fixed terminal date T < ∞. Sensitivity then
arises with respect to the chosen date T .
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to extend the IREE presented in the present paper so as to incorporate private information. This
extension would cause private information REE to be a special case of private information IREE.
The relationship between IREE and Arrow–Debreu equilibrium has been discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4 above. The absence of Arrow securities in our model appears to be an important
ingredient giving rise to the possibility that IREE outcomes can differ from the Arrow–Debreu
equilibrium outcomes. It seems worthwhile investigating this issue in greater detail in future
research.
Our work is also related to a number of papers in the learning literature that attempt to con-
struct a full set of beliefs over long-horizons, see important work by Preston [31] and Eusepi and
Preston [14]. The main difference is that our agents’ beliefs take the form of a well-defined prob-
ability measure over a stochastic process while these papers use the anticipated utility framework
of Kreps [22]. As a consequence, agents in these models construct each period a new probability
measure, but one that is almost surely inconsistent with the measure held in the previous period.
The setup in this paper is also indirectly related to the literature on rational beliefs initiated by
Mordecai Kurz [23]. In rational beliefs models agents’ probability densities are assumed to be
shifting in response to the realization of an extrinsic ‘generating sequence’. In our model belief
revisions are triggered by model intrinsic factors, i.e., market outcomes and fundamentals. More-
over, in rational belief models, agents entertain a standard probability space over fundamentals.
Thus, unlike in the present setup, agents’ joint beliefs about prices and dividends incorporates a
singularity.
The IREE is also related to the model-consistent equilibrium concept of Anderson and Son-
nenschein [6] who assume that agents have a parameterized econometric model that defines a
probability density over prices. Anderson and Sonnenschein, however, impose a kind of rational
expectations structure on the beliefs of agents: within the class of models considered, agents are
assumed to employ the parameter values that best fit the actual outcome of the data. Thus, unlike
in our setting there is no learning from market outcomes because agents are assumed to know
the best fitting model from the start.
The paper is also related to recent work on self-confirming equilibrium (SCE), see Fudenberg
and Levine [18], Sargent [33], and Cho and Sargent [11]. An SCE is a stationary equilibrium
in which agents know the objective probability distributions as they emerge in equilibrium, al-
though agents may entertain wrong beliefs about what would happen off the equilibrium path.28
In SCE agents’ joint beliefs over fundamentals and market outcomes thus features a singular-
ity, as in the case with rational expectations. The singularity again reflects the fact that agents
have perfect knowledge about equilibrium market behavior, possibly because they can observe
an infinite history of past equilibrium outcomes and have learned to optimally condition on the
past. This contrasts with the situation described in an IREE, where agents are uncertain about
equilibrium market behavior and their beliefs do not contain a singularity, possibly because they
do not observe infinite amounts of past (stationary equilibrium) market outcomes. An IREE can
nevertheless converge asymptotically to an SCE or an REE, as is actually the case in our example
in Section 5. And to avoid situations in which agents have infinite amounts of past data available
but still forecast suboptimally, our definition of an IREE in Section 3.4 could have added the
following requirement: if an IREE converges to a stationary outcome, then this outcome must be
an SCE or REE. The difficulty with this and similar restrictions on asymptotic rationality is that
28 This generates gaps between REE and SCE, as an REE is an SCE but not vice versa.
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arise from such asymptotic requirements on forecast optimality. And requiring full optimality of
beliefs along the convergence process leads one back to the concept of a Bayesian REE. In the
light of this discussion, the development of a general metric allowing to quantify intermediate
degrees of forecast rationality over a convergence process appears to be an important task for
future research.
8. Conclusions
We formulate a model with internally rational agents that fail to be externally rational because
they possess limited knowledge about the market. Lack of market knowledge naturally gives rise
to learning from market outcomes, so that expectations regarding the future market outcomes
become an important determinant of the current market outcome, independently from agents’
expectations about fundamentals. Since market outcomes feed back into agents beliefs, imperfect
market knowledge can give rise to additional propagation in economic models.
The present paper shows – perhaps surprisingly – that some of the modeling choices in the
adaptive learning literature, e.g., the use of one-step-ahead Euler equations, are less ad-hoc than
might initially appear. Adam, Marcet and Nicolini [4] show that this generalizes to a setting with
risk averse agents, provided stock market wealth is a negligible part of agents’ total wealth. Yet,
in the more appealing case with non-negligible stock market wealth this ceases to be true. Long
horizon asset price forecasts then matter for current equilibrium prices, as shown in Adam and
Marcet [3]. This is so because future prices affect future consumption abilities and agents dis-
like consumption volatility when they are risk averse. The microfoundations of the model are
thus informative about which beliefs matter for the equilibrium outcomes in models of learn-
ing.
We believe that internal rationality is an interesting approach to describe agent behavior in
models of learning. It gives rise to models of learning that are fully consistent with optimizing
behavior and provides a rationale for equilibrium equations with very different implications than
those emerging from the standard REE approach. We expect the concept of internal rationality
to have a wide range of fruitful applications in many field of economics dealing with dynamic
decision making.
Appendix A
A.1. Existence of a maximum
Strictly speaking one has to guarantee existence of a maximum before the first order condi-
tions (8) can be used. With arbitrary price beliefs and risk neutrality existence of a maximum
is in question, since an agent that assigns positive probability to prices growing at a rate larger
than δ−1 achieves infinite utility. We outline below how to modify slightly the agents’ utility in
a way that existence is guaranteed and that the pricing implications of the model are virtually
unchanged. We only consider beliefs P such that P,D > 0 almost surely.
Consider the family of utility functions that is indexed by a finite constant C
UC
(
Cit
)= {Cit , Cit  C
C + g(Ci − C), Ci > Ct t
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g(0) = 0, g′(0) = 1 and g(·) g. We have UC = 1 for C < C but UC < 1 for C  C.
The consumer’s problem can be rewritten as a function only of the choice for contingent
stock holding plans S = {S0, S1, . . .} with St : Ωt → [0, S]. Since for any given C the objective
function is bounded and since the action space S is compact, an expected utility maximizing plan
does exist. We now show that for any finite number of periods T < ∞, the first order conditions
with this bounded utility function are arbitrarily close to those used in the main text as C → ∞.
Hence, the pricing implications are arbitrarily close to those in the main text.
Actual consumption Cit in equilibrium is bounded by the available dividends Dt . Thus, for
any T < ∞ the probability that {Dt  C}Tt=0 in equilibrium is close to one when C is sufficiently
high. Therefore, with arbitrarily high probability the agent’s first order conditions in t = 1, . . . , T
are given by
Pt = δiEP it
[
U ′
C
(
Cit+1
)
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]
and Sit ∈ [0, S] (32)
plus the slackness conditions for Sit = S or Sit = 0. From Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence
Theorem
lim
C→∞
EP it
[
U ′
C
(
Cit+1
)
(Pt+1 + Dt+1)
]= EP it [(Pt+1 + Dt+1)] (33)
This implies that for C → ∞ the first order conditions (32) approximate with arbitrary precision
the first order conditions (8) used in the main text.
A.2. Approximation of beliefs
We prove (26), ‘≈’ denotes an equality correct up to first order.
EPt
(
elogβ
P
elog ε
P
t+1
)≈ EPt (1 + logβP + log εPt+1)= 1 + logβPt
= 1 + 1
t + ν0
t∑
j=1
log
Pj
Pj−1
+ ν0
t + ν0 lnβ
P
0
≈ 1
t + ν0
t∑
j=1
Pj
Pj−1
+ ν0
t + ν0 β
P
0 = β̂Pt
the first line approximates logβP and log εPt+1 around logβP= log εPt+1=0, uses EPt log εPt+1=0
and that EPt [logβP ] = logβPt 29; the second line uses the update rule (25a); the third line approx-
imates Pj/Pj−1 and βP0 around Pj/Pj−1 = 1 and logβP = 0.
A.3. Proof of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix t and Dt . For any realization ωD ∈ ΩD for which the first t elements
are given by Dt , the law of motion for dividends for all j  1 implies
29 This follows from the fact that the marginal posterior for (logβP , logβD)′ is Student t -distributed, location vector
(logβPt , logβDt )′ . See Chapter 9.11 in DeGroot [13].
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j∏
τ=1
ηt+τ (ωD)Dt
so that the partial discounted sum can be expressed as
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j (ωD) =
T∑
j=1
δj a(ωD)
j
T∏
τ=1
ηt+τ (ωD)Dt (34)
To prove the first part of the proposition notice
EP
(
lim
T →∞
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j (ωD)
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
EP
(
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j (ωD)
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
= EP
(
T∑
j=1
δj a(ωD)
j
j∏
τ=1
ηt+τ (ωD)Dt
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
= Dt
∞∫
0
(
T∑
j=1
δj (˜a)j
)
Postt (˜a) da˜
Dt
∞∫
δ−1
(
T∑
j=1
δj (˜a)j
)
Postt (˜a) da˜
Dt · T ·
∞∫
δ−1
Postt (˜a) da˜ = ∞ (35)
where the first inequality uses the fact Dt  0, the first equality the expression (34), the next
equality the independence of future η’s from Dt and a, the next inequality uses the fact that
dividends are positive and the second the fact that δa˜  1 over the considered range of in-
tegration. The last equality uses that since part of the support is higher than δ−1 implies∫∞
δ−1 Postt (˜a) da˜ > 0.
To prove the second part of the proposition, given t, define the function
F(ωD) =
∞∑
j=1
δjBj
j∏
τ=1
ηt+τ (ωD)Dt
By standard arguments, the infinite sum on the right side exists almost surely and is finite.
Therefore, F is well defined for almost all ωD and is integrable since EP (F(ωD) | Dt) =
δB
1−δB Dt < ∞. Moreover, for all T and for given Dt
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j (ωD)F(ωD) a.s.
Therefore, the partial sums (34) are bounded a.s. by the integrable function F , so that we can
apply Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem to obtain the first equality below:
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(
lim
T →∞
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
= lim
T →∞E
P
(
T∑
j=1
δjDt+j
∣∣∣∣Dt
)
= Dt
∞∫
0
(
lim
T →∞
T∑
j=1
δj (˜a)j
)
Postt (˜a) da˜
= DtEPostt
(
δa
1 − δa
)
The second equality follows from using (34) and taking expectations as when deriving (35). This
proves the second part of the proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is by construction. Let us first prove that P0 → ∞ for a
sequence of priors when k → ∞. Given any prior f with upper bound for the support B < δ−1
we can construct an alternative sequence of priors
f k(a) =
{
(1 − Bk−B
k
)f (a) for a ∈ [0,B]
1
k
for a ∈ ]B,Bk]
where Bk = max{B,δ−1(1 − 1
k
)}.
The density f k distributes probability mass 1
k
uniformly on the interval ]B,Bk], here Bk is
the upper bound for the support of f k and we have limk→∞ Bk = δ−1. As required this sequence
of alternative priors satisfies
∫ |f k − f | → 0 as k → ∞ because
∫ ∣∣f k − f ∣∣= B∫
0
∣∣∣∣Bk − Bk f
∣∣∣∣+
Bk∫
B
1
k
= 2B
k − B
k
< 2
δ−1 − B
k
Moreover, it follows from part 1 of Proposition 1 and simple derivations that
P0 = EPk0
( ∞∑
j=1
δjDj
)
= D0Ef k
(
δa
1 − δa
)
D0
Bk∫
B
δa˜
1 − δa˜ f
k(˜a) da˜ D0
Bδ
k
Bk∫
B
1
1 − δa˜ da˜
Using the change of variables x = 1 − δa˜ the integral in the last line can be expressed as
Bk∫
B
1
1 − δa˜ da˜ =
1−δB∫
1−δBk
1
x
dx = 1
(1 − δBk)2 −
1
(1 − δB)2
and we have
lim
k→∞
Bδ
k
Bk∫
B
1
1 − δa˜ da˜ = limk→∞
Bδ
k
(
k2 − 1
(1 − δB)2
)
= ∞
which establishes the claim for P0.
K. Adam, A. Marcet / Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 1224–1252 1251For Pt , all that changes is that the posterior for each f k is scaled by the likelihood of the
observed realization according to the model at hand. As long as the likelihood puts positive
weight on all parameter values below δ−1 the derivations above work in the same way. 
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